Decentralized combinatorial optimization.

Combinatorial optimization is a widely-studied class of computational problems with many theoretical and real-world applications. Optimization problems are typically tackled using hardware and software controlled by the user. Optimization can be competitive where problems are solved by competing agents in isolation, or by groups sharing hardware and software in a distributed manner. Blockchain technology enables decentralized applications (DApps). Optimization as a DApp would be run in a trustless manner where participation in the system is voluntary and problem-solving is incentivized with bitcoin, ether, or other fungible tokens. Using a purpose-built blockchain introduces the problem of bootstrapping robust immutability and token value. This is solved by building a DApp as a smart-contract on top of an existing Turing-complete blockchain platform such as Ethereum. We propose a means of using Ethereum Virtual Machine smart contracts to automate the payout of cryptocurrency rewards for market-based voluntary participation in the solution of combinatorial optimization problems without trusted intermediaries. We suggest use of this method for optimization-as-a-service, automation of contests, and long-term recording of best-known solutions

Account Management in Proof of Stake Ledgers

Blockchain protocols based on Proof-of-Stake (PoS) depend — by nature — on the active participation of stakeholders. If users are offline and abstain from the PoS consensus mechanism, the system’s security is at risk, so it is imperative to explore ways to both maximize the level of participation and minimize the effects of non-participation. One such option is stake representation, such that users can delegate their participation rights and, in the process, form stake pools . The core idea is that stake pool operators always participate on behalf of regular users, while the users retain the ownership of their assets. Our work provides a formal PoS wallet construction that enables delegation and stake pool formation. While investigating the construction of addresses in this setting, we distil and explore address malleability, a security property that captures the ability of an attacker to manipulate the delegation information associated with an address. Our analysis consists of identifying multiple levels of malleability, which are taken into account in our paper’s core result. We then introduce the first ideal functionality of a PoS wallet’s core which captures the PoS wallet’s capabilities and is realized as a secure protocol based on standard cryptographic primitives. Finally, we cover how to use the wallet core in conjunction with a PoS ledger, as well as investigate how delegation and stake pools affect a PoS system’s security

Blockchain-Based Auditing of Transparent Log Servers

Part 1: AdministrationInternational audiencePublic key server is a simple yet effective way of key management in secure end-to-end communication. To ensure the trustworthiness of a public key server, CONIKS employs a tamper-evident data structure on the server and a gossiping protocol among clients in order to detect compromised servers. However, due to lack of incentive and vulnerability to malicious clients, a gossiping protocol is hard to implement in practice. Meanwhile, alternative solutions such as EthIKS are too costly. This paper presents Trusternity, an auditing scheme relying on Ethereum blockchain that is easy to implement, inexpensive to operate and resilient to malicious clients. We also conduct an empirical study of system behaviour in face of attacks and propose a lightweight anomaly detection algorithm to protect clients against such attacks

Anonymity and Rewards in Peer Rating Systems

When peers rate each other, they may choose to rate inaccurately in order to boost their own reputation or unfairly lower another’s. This could be successfully mitigated by having a reputation server incentivise accurate ratings with a reward. However, assigning rewards becomes a challenge when ratings are anonymous, since the reputation server cannot tell which peers to reward for rating accurately. To address this, we propose an anonymous peer rating system in which users can be rewarded for accurate ratings, and we formally define its model and security requirements. In our system ratings are rewarded in batches, so that users claiming their rewards only reveal they authored one in this batch of ratings. To ensure the anonymity set of rewarded users is not reduced, we also split the reputation server into two entities, the Rewarder, who knows which ratings are rewarded, and the Reputation Holder, who knows which users were rewarded. We give a provably secure construction satisfying all the security properties required. For our construction we use a modification of a Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme to ensure that peers can prove their own reputation when rating others, and that multiple feedback on the same subject can be detected. We then use Linkable Ring Signatures to enable peers to be rewarded for their accurate ratings, while still ensuring that ratings are anonymous. Our work results in a system which allows for accurate ratings to be rewarded, whilst still providing anonymity of ratings with respect to the central entities managing the system

Leaders in Social Networks, the Delicious Case

Finding pertinent information is not limited to search engines. Online communities can amplify the influence of a small number of power users for the benefit of all other users. Users' information foraging in depth and breadth can be greatly enhanced by choosing suitable leaders. For instance in delicious.com, users subscribe to leaders' collection which lead to a deeper and wider reach not achievable with search engines. To consolidate such collective search, it is essential to utilize the leadership topology and identify influential users. Google's PageRank, as a successful search algorithm in the World Wide Web, turns out to be less effective in networks of people. We thus devise an adaptive and parameter-free algorithm, the LeaderRank, to quantify user influence. We show that LeaderRank outperforms PageRank in terms of ranking effectiveness, as well as robustness against manipulations and noisy data. These results suggest that leaders who are aware of their clout may reinforce the development of social networks, and thus the power of collective search

Towards a Smart Contract-based, Decentralized, Public-Key Infrastructure

Public-key infrastructures (PKIs) are an integral part of the security foundations of digital communications. Their widespread deployment has allowed the growth of important applications, such as, internet banking and e-commerce. Centralized PKIs (CPKIs) rely on a hierarchy of trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) for issuing, distributing and managing the status of digital certificates, i.e., unforgeable data structures that attest to the authenticity of an entity\u27s public key. Unfortunately, CPKIs have many downsides in terms of security and fault tolerance and there have been numerous security incidents throughout the years. Decentralized PKIs (DPKIs) were proposed to deal with these issues as they rely on multiple, independent nodes. Nevertheless, decentralization raises other concerns such as what are the incentives for the participating nodes to ensure the service\u27s availability. In our work, we leverage the scalability, as well as, the built-in incentive mechanism of blockchain systems and propose a smart contract-based DPKI. The main barrier in realizing a smart contract-based DPKI is the size of the contract\u27s state which, being its most expensive resource to access, should be minimized for a construction to be viable. We resolve this problem by proposing and using in our DPKI a public-state cryptographic accumulator with constant size, a cryptographic tool which may be of independent interest in the context of blockchain protocols. We also are the first to formalize the DPKI design problem in the Universal Composability (UC) framework and formally prove the security of our construction under the strong RSA assumption in the Random Oracle model and the existence of an ideal smart contract functionality

Towards Blockchain-Based Identity and Access Management for Internet of Things in Enterprises

With the Internet of Things (IoT) evolving more and more, companies active within this area face new challenges for their Identity and Access Management (IAM). Namely, general security, resource constraint devices, interoperability, and scalability cannot be addressed anymore with traditional measures. Blockchain technology, however, may act as an enabler to overcome those challenges. In this paper, general application areas for blockchain in IAM are described based on recent research work. On this basis, it is discussed how blockchain can address IAM challenges presented by IoT. Finally, a corporate scenario utilizing blockchain-based IAM for IoT is outlined to assess the applicability in practice. The paper shows that private blockchains can be leveraged to design tamper-proof IAM functionality while maintaining scalability regarding the number of clients and transactions. This could be useful for enterprises to prevent single-point-of-failures as well as to enable transparent and secure auditing & monitoring of security-relevant events

Designing Proof of Human-work Puzzles for Cryptocurrency and Beyond

We introduce the novel notion of a Proof of Human-work (PoH) and present the first distributed consensus protocol from hard Artificial Intelligence problems. As the name suggests, a PoH is a proof that a {\em human} invested a moderate amount of effort to solve some challenge. A PoH puzzle should be moderately hard for a human to solve. However, a PoH puzzle must be hard for a computer to solve, including the computer that generated the puzzle, without sufficient assistance from a human. By contrast, CAPTCHAs are only difficult for other computers to solve --- not for the computer that generated the puzzle. We also require that a PoH be publicly verifiable by a computer without any human assistance and without ever interacting with the agent who generated the proof of human-work. We show how to construct PoH puzzles from indistinguishability obfuscation and from CAPTCHAs. We motivate our ideas with two applications: HumanCoin and passwords. We use PoH puzzles to construct HumanCoin, the first cryptocurrency system with human miners. Second, we use proofs of human work to develop a password authentication scheme which provably protects users against offline attacks

Consensus from Signatures of Work

Assuming the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI), digital signatures are a fundamental building block in the design of secure consensus protocols with optimal resilience. More recently, with the advent of blockchain protocols like Bitcoin, consensus has been considered in the ``permissionless\u27\u27 setting where no authentication or even point-to-point communication is available. Yet, despite some positive preliminary results, there has been no attempt to formalize a building block that is sufficient for designing consensus protocols in this setting. In this work we fill this void by putting forth a formalization of such a primitive, which we call {\em signatures of work} (SoW). Distinctive features of our new notion are a lower bound on the number of steps required to produce a signature; fast verification; {\em moderate unforgeability}---producing a sequence of SoWs, for chosen messages, does not provide an advantage to an adversary in terms of running time; and signing time independence---most relevant in concurrent multi-party applications, as we show. Armed with SoW, we then present a new permissionless consensus protocol which is secure assuming an honest majority of computational power, thus providing a blockchain counterpart to the classical Dolev-Strong consensus protocol. The protocol is built on top of a SoW-based blockchain and standard properties of the underlying hash function, thus improving on the only known provably secure consensus protocol in this setting, which relies on the random-oracle model in a fundamental way